Financing Employee-managed Firms: Some Problems of a Wider Extension
| Autor: | Lars A. Engberg |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 1993 |
| Předmět: |
Finance
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management business.industry Strategy and Management Financial risk media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 050209 industrial relations Equity (finance) Financial risk management General Business Management and Accounting Incentive Information asymmetry Management of Technology and Innovation Debt 0502 economics and business Opportunism business Risk financing 050203 business & management media_common |
| Zdroj: | Economic and Industrial Democracy. 14:277-300 |
| ISSN: | 1461-7099 0143-831X |
| DOI: | 10.1177/0143831x93142007 |
| Popis: | A wider extension of employee-managed firms in Western marketa economies is assumed to be limited by three financially related internal obstacles. Employees are: relatively poor, risk-averse and opportunistic. Thus a wider extension implies outside financing (some combination of outside equity and debt). But asymmetric information and opportunism in relation to outside financing lead to agency problems. It is concluded that a wider extension especially to capital-intensive industries implies the building up of separate financial institutions to supply outside financing, some risk-taking by employees to restore incentives and some violation of the employeemanaged firms' autonomy to protect outside financing against default. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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