Reframing the Political Economy of New Drugs
Autor: | Brita Pekarsky |
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Rok vydání: | 2014 |
Předmět: | |
Zdroj: | The New Drug Reimbursement Game ISBN: 9783319089027 |
DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-319-08903-4_2 |
Popis: | The first rule of the new drug reimbursement game is to recognise it is a game and that the regulator makes the rules. The economic expression of this game is the Political Economy of New Drugs (PEND). The global PEND is driven and shaped primarily by the US: its pharmaceutical industry; its government via trade-negotiations with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and US-based academic pharma-economists and the evidence they generate. In this chapter I use the PEND to illustrate the characteristics of this game. What is the political economy of new drugs? How does it influence the research agenda? Does it change over time? As the US starts to address issues such as whether it should use evidence of cost-effectiveness to make decisions about drug reimbursement, the global PEND must adapt to respond to the new forms of evidence and decision rules. I demonstrate how OECD regulators outside the US could use this time of change to reframe the global PEND. The reframed PEND would facilitate a strategic and economically meaningful choice in the decision threshold and allows regulators to respond optimally to the primary strategy of the pharmaceutical industry; the threat that lowering the price below a firm’s preferred price is not in the best interests of the population. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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