Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules
| Autor: | Peter Buisseret |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
05 social sciences Plurality rule Foundation (evidence) Conventional wisdom 0506 political science Competition (economics) 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration Economics Deterrence theory 050207 economics Finance Industrial organization Law and economics |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior. 104:494-506 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.007 |
| Popis: | I study electoral competition between established parties under threat of entry by a challenger under non-majoritarian run-off elections. In contrast with classical majoritarian run-off elections, I show how non-majoritarian rules can facilitate two-party systems, including those in which the established parties deter the challenger's entry by adopting differentiated platforms. I also show that non-majoritarian run-off rules may facilitate entry deterrence by established parties in settings where a plurality rule cannot. My results provide a striking counterpoint to a conventional wisdom—embodied, most notably, in Duverger's Hypothesis —that associates run-off rules with multi-party systems. Finally, they provide a theoretical foundation for patterns of electoral competition observed in countries using non-majoritarian rules that contradict this conventional wisdom. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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