LEFT FOR DEAD: ANTI‐COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR IN ORBITAL SPACE
| Autor: | Daniel R. Shiman, Jerry B. Duvall, Nodir Adilov, Peter J. Alexander, Brendan M. Cunningham |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Marginal cost
Economics and Econometrics Depreciation 05 social sciences Social Welfare Investment (macroeconomics) General Business Management and Accounting Microeconomics Market structure Incentive 0502 economics and business Economics Perfect competition 050207 economics Monopoly 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | Economic Inquiry. 57:1497-1509 |
| ISSN: | 1465-7295 0095-2583 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/ecin.12790 |
| Popis: | In a dynamic investment framework with depreciation, we show incumbent satellite operators have incentives to “warehouse” a fraction of their assigned spectrum and orbital slots, keeping nonoperational assets in place, which reduces output, increases prices, and diminishes social welfare. Exploring three distinct market structures, we model firms' incentives to warehouse, and show conditions under which firms choose to warehouse rather than replace nonfunctioning satellites. We find a dominant firm with a competitive fringe produces more and longer duration warehousing relative to perfect competition or monopoly. Regulators could remediate warehousing by increasing a firm's marginal costs, or by increasing the probability of reallocating orbital slots that do not have a fully functioning satellite. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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