| Popis: |
We conducted a series of deception game and dictator game experiments design specifically to investigate conformist tendencies in strategic interactions. What distinguishes our study from extant research on deceptive communication games is the relatively large number of conditions examined. In addition to three different “selfish” conditions, we also employed one “Pareto altruistic” condition as well as a “spiteful” one. Our results indicate that subjects exhibited conformist tendencies for selfish lies in the deception game as well as for selfish payoff allocations in the dictator game. Interestingly, our sender subjects in the deception game were relatively more likely to refrain from sending altruistic messages and instead to communicate nonaltruistic truthful messages, whenever they knew that a majority of their peers had previously chosen to do so. Additionally, our subjects were, on average, truthful when they knew that their peers had not lied spitefully. |
