BELIEFS ABOUT OTHER-REGARDING PREFERENCES IN A SEQUENTIAL PUBLIC GOODS GAME

Autor:	William S. Neilson, Jennifer C. Coats
Rok vydání:	2005
Předmět:	Microeconomics Economics and Econometrics Inequality media_common.quotation_subject Public goods game Spite Economics First-mover advantage Public good Discount points General Business Management and Accounting Reciprocity (cultural anthropology) media_common
Zdroj:	Economic Inquiry. 43:614-622
ISSN:	1465-7295 0095-2583
DOI:	10.1093/ei/cbi042
Popis:	Experimental evidence is used to deduce players' beliefs about their opponents' concern for others. The experiment is a sequential public good provision game with a provision point and two different refund rules. A theory is constructed to show how early contributions should change with the refund rule depending on the first mover's beliefs about subsequent players' other-regarding preferences. The evidence rejects the hypothesis that early players believe that their opponents are inequality averse and also rejects the hypothesis that early players are concerned with security. The evidence is consistent with beliefs in spite, reciprocity, or a concern for security. (JEL H41, C90, D63, D64)
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::47d3deb8894a9d122d78c6483fef9627 https://doi.org/10.1093/ei/cbi042 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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