Group-identity and long-run cooperation: an experiment
| Autor: | Gabriele Camera, Lukas Hohl |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Economics and Econometrics Repetition (rhetorical device) Random assignment Group (mathematics) 05 social sciences Context (language use) Social dilemma Task (project management) Group Affiliation Collective identity 0502 economics and business 050207 economics Psychology Social psychology 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 188:903-915 |
| ISSN: | 0167-2681 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.017 |
| Popis: | We stress-test the limits of the power of group identity in the context of cooperation by constructing laboratory economies where participants confront an indefinitely repeated social dilemma as strangers. Group identity is artificially induced by random assignment to color-coded groups, and reinforced by an initial cooperation task played in-group and in fixed pairs. Subsequently subjects interact in-group and out-group in large economies, as strangers. Indefinite repetition guarantees full cooperation is an equilibrium. Decision-makers can discriminate based on group affiliation, but cannot observe past behaviors. We find no evidence of group biases. This suggests that group effects are less likely to emerge when players cannot easily observe and compare characteristics on which to base categorizations and behaviors. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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