Ius In Bello I

Autor: Arthur Ripstein
Rok vydání: 2021
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197604205.003.0004
Popis: This chapter characterizes the prohibitive nature of the ius in bello rules in order to explain why they apply to both sides in a conflict. The chapter identifies other familiar cases in which rules governing the conduct of an activity apply even to people who are not entitled to participate in it, such as unlicensed drivers and kidnappers of children. The remainder of the chapter explains the prohibition of perfidy, the paradigmatic violation of which is a false surrender. Kant argues that perfidy is “wrong in the highest degree” because its principle makes rightful relations between nations impossible. Perfidy is a wrong that is specific to war, not a special case of a more general moral prohibition of deceit; as a wrong internal to war, it is wrong in the same way when committed by either side in a conflict.
Databáze: OpenAIRE