Competing Principals? Legislative Representation in List Proportional Representation Systems
| Autor: | Carlo Prato, Peter Buisseret |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Flexibility (engineering)
Sociology and Political Science Public economics Proportional representation 05 social sciences Rank (computer programming) Legislature 0506 political science Representation (politics) Microeconomics Ballot Political science 0502 economics and business Political Science and International Relations 050602 political science & public administration Party line 050207 economics Legislator |
| Zdroj: | American Journal of Political Science. 66:156-170 |
| ISSN: | 1540-5907 0092-5853 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/ajps.12559 |
| Popis: | We develop a new framework to study legislative representation in list proportional representation (PR) systems. Our model studies a legislator’s incentives to balance the competing interests of party leaders and local voters under a variety of list PR systems. We consider open and closed lists, as well as flexible lists—in which both rank assignments and preference votes determine the order in which seats are filled. We find that more flexibility can worsen local representation. List flexibility also acts as a key mediator of the effect of voter partisanship on party cohesion. And, our analysis reveals that higher district magnitude encourages representatives to toe the party line under all ballot systems. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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