| Popis: |
IN JANUARY, 1933, Raymond Moley and Rexford G. Tugwell, professors at Columbia University and members of Roosevelt's original Brain Trust, concluded that the President-elect had accepted the Stimson Doctrine as a basis for formulating America's Far Eastern policy. They met Roosevelt in his New York City residence and voiced their objections. In his After Seven Years Moley gives an account of this meeting, describing in a general way the nationalist position which he and Tugwell advocated. This brief essay presents, in the context of other relevant statements by Tugwell, Moley's summary of what he said to Roosevelt on the day the die was cast in American policy towards Japan. On January 17, 1933, Roosevelt made a statement to the press on foreign policy. Journalists, state department officials, and Roosevelt's advisers interpreted this statement as an endorsement of the Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition of the Japanese penetration of China. The Brain Trusters and nearly all others outside of the Hoover administration assumed that there was only one doctrine of nonrecognition. Professor Richard N. Current, however, has held that during the course of a struggle between Hoover and Stimson to name and define the doctrine, "nonrecognition" came to mean different things to the President and the secretary of state. Hoover opposed recognition of treaties resulting from the use of force. Stimson "always wanted to go in for withdrawal of diplomats or an economic embargo, either or both of which measures would almost inevitably lead to war." Hoover favored disarmament rather than economic sanctions as a means of implementing a pact of peace. Stimson called disarmament "just a proposition from Alice in Wonderland.''" |
