Recruiting the CEO from the Board: Determinants and Consequences
| Autor: | Udi Hoitash, Anahit Mkrtchyan |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Labour economics Leadership change 050208 finance ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Market reaction ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Ecological succession CEO succession Accounting 0502 economics and business Quality (business) Business ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS 050203 business & management Finance media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 53:1261-1295 |
| ISSN: | 1756-6916 0022-1090 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/s002210901800011x |
| Popis: | We investigate an increasingly prevalent CEO succession strategy: recruiting CEOs from the board of directors (director–CEOs). Director–CEOs might be hired in a planned succession because they combine outsiders’ new perspectives with insiders’ firm-specific knowledge. Alternatively, directors may be recruited when the board is unprepared for a leadership change. We find that unplanned successions, in which director–CEOs are appointed as a “quick-fix” solution, result in a negative market reaction, deterioration in performance, and ill-fitting candidates with shorter tenures. Conversely, firms recruiting director–CEOs in planned successions perform similarly to other firms. We find no evidence that poor firm quality drives these results. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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