| Popis: |
Chapter 3 discusses how we establish divisions of agential labor via promises, requests, agreements, and, finally, commitments in shared action. Though there are several accounts on offer for these social phenomena, the argument for authority-based accountability applies to all of them. With respect to promises, in this chapter normative-power accounts, conventionalist accounts and expectationalist accounts are considered; each is compatible with the view that promises confer protected reasons, and thus, divisions of agential labor. Requests do so as well, even though, unlike promises and agreements, requests are not binding. In discussing shared action, the chapter considers Margaret Gilbert’s and Michael Bratman’s accounts. The result is that those engaged in shared action will typically (if not necessarily) bear authority-based accountability for what they together do. What about immoral promises, requests, agreements, and shared actions? They also confer protected reasons, albeit practical rather than moral ones. The chapter ends by noting that this picture can help make sense of accountability in the context of group agency. |
