Random key rotation: Side-channel countermeasure of NTRU cryptosystem for resource-limited devices
| Autor: | Guoshuang Zhang, Xuexin Zheng, Ce Wang, Rixin Xu, Weina Tian, An Wang |
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| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Engineering
Theoretical computer science General Computer Science business.industry Cycles per instruction NTRU 020206 networking & telecommunications 02 engineering and technology 020202 computer hardware & architecture Computer engineering Collision attack Control and Systems Engineering Barrel shifter 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Key (cryptography) Cryptosystem Side channel attack Smart card Hardware_ARITHMETICANDLOGICSTRUCTURES Electrical and Electronic Engineering business |
| Zdroj: | Computers & Electrical Engineering. 63:220-231 |
| ISSN: | 0045-7906 |
| Popis: | The NTRU algorithm, as IEEE P1363.1 standard, has been widely applied in resource-limited cryptosystems such as wearable embedded systems, smart cards, and so on. In 2013, Zheng et al. presented collision attack on three NTRU countermeasures from Lee et al., which are the only three countermeasures of NTRU against side-channel analysis so far. In this paper, we give a new countermeasure named Random Key Rotation (RKR) against the existing statistical side-channel analysis. According to analysis and experiments on STC89C52 microprocessor, little information of the key is leaked by collision attack, second-order correlation power analysis, etc. Furthermore, implementation schemes of RKR countermeasure in software and hardware are suggested. Under typical parameters, barrel shifter implementation of RKR only costs 8-bit extra register and one extra clock cycle (as well as 16 extra multiplexers). |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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