Donor Strategy under the Fungibility of Foreign Aid

Autor:	Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, Sajal Lahiri
Rok vydání:	2004
Předmět:	Microeconomics Economics and Econometrics Development economics Economics Fungibility
Zdroj:	Economics and Politics. 16:213-231
ISSN:	1468-0343 0954-1985
DOI:	10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00138.x
Popis:	We develop a political–economic model of aid fungibility: a part of aid is diverted away from its intended target by lobby groups. The size of this diversion – the degree of aid fungibility – is determined endogenously by the recipient government. The donor can affect the equilibrium degree of fungibility by choosing both the size of aid and the timing of its decision. We derive a condition under which the donor's reaction to fungibility is to reduce the amount of aid. Under this condition, if the donor acts as a follower, both the donor and the target group are better off.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4352e81a462a0d00b2e2b81ded177ad0 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00138.x Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF