Cybercrime in Ukraine and the Cyber Security Game
| Autor: | Svitlana Mazepa, Serhiy Banakh, Libor Dostalek, Vlastimil Krivan |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Value (ethics)
Strategic asset allocation 0209 industrial biotechnology 02 engineering and technology Computer security computer.software_genre Matrix games Cybercrime symbols.namesake 020303 mechanical engineering & transports 020901 industrial engineering & automation 0203 mechanical engineering Nash equilibrium Scale (social sciences) symbols Malware Asset (economics) Business GeneralLiterature_REFERENCE(e.g. dictionaries encyclopedias glossaries) computer |
| Zdroj: | ACIT |
| DOI: | 10.1109/acit49673.2020.9208942 |
| Popis: | This paper reviews some massive cyber-attacks in Ukraine. It demonstrates the scale and dynamics of cybercrime in Ukraine. Motivated by cybercrime we develop a two-player two-strategy matrix game between a defender that can either protect its strategic asset or leave it unprotected, and a defender that can either attack the defender’s asset, or not. We assume that defending and attacking strategies are costly, and the value of the strategic asset is higher than are the costs of defending /attacking it. We show that under generic conditions on parameters the game has a single mixed Nash equilibrium. At this equilibrium the probability that the attacker will attack decreases with the value of the asset while the probability that the defender will actively defend increases. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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