No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief

Autor:	N P Hughes
Rok vydání:	2017
Předmět:	Philosophy Argument 060302 philosophy 05 social sciences Subject (philosophy) Irrationality 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences 06 humanities and the arts Norm (social) 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Mathematics Epistemology
Zdroj:	Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 6:157-166
ISSN:	2161-2234
DOI:	10.1002/tht3.244
Popis:	Recently it has been increasingly popular to argue that knowledge is the norm of belief. I present an argument against this view. The argument trades on the epistemic situation of the subject in the bad case. Notably, unlike with other superficially similar arguments against knowledge norms, knowledge normers preferred strategy of appealing to the distinction between permissibility and excusability cannot help them to rebut this argument.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
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