Why teams achieve higher negotiation profits than individuals: the mediating role of deceptive tactics
| Autor: | Frank Jacob, Robert Wilken, Tayfun Aykac, Nathalie Prime |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Marketing
media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 050109 social psychology Absolute level Commission Deception Negotiation Misrepresentation Originality 0502 economics and business 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Business Business and International Management Social psychology 050203 business & management media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing. 32:567-579 |
| ISSN: | 0885-8624 |
| DOI: | 10.1108/jbim-10-2015-0179 |
| Popis: | PurposeThis study aims to investigate the use of deceptive negotiation tactics to explain why teams can attain higher negotiation profits than individual negotiators. The study distinguishes deception by commission (i.e. active misrepresentation of preferences) from deception by omission (i.e. passive misrepresentation of preferences).Design/methodology/approachThe sample used to test the mediation hypothesis was made up of data from two electronically mediated negotiation simulations encompassing 75 negotiation dyads with 278 participants. The methodology involved coding deceptive negotiation tactics from the log files by counting utterances related to indifference options that enabled negotiation parties to deceive.FindingsThe results show that teams do apply deceptive negotiation tactics more frequently than individual negotiators and that this behavior helps them increase their negotiation profits.Originality/valueThe findings are valuable for two reasons. First, the study included controls for other important antecedents of deceptive behavior and negotiation outcome (e.g. negotiators’ nationalities, first bids). Consequently, the empirical results underline the importance of considering team size to understand its impact on profits through the use of deceptive tactics. Second, although this study does show that deception increases negotiation profits, the absolute level of deception is rather small (on average just one deceptive statement per negotiation). |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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