Exploiting Security Dependence for Conditional Speculation Against Spectre Attacks
| Autor: | Peinan Li, Lixin Zhang, Dan Meng, Rui Hou, Lutan Zhao, Peng Liu, Michael C. Huang |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Out-of-order execution
Computer science Pipeline (computing) Speculative execution 02 engineering and technology Privilege (computing) Hazard (computer architecture) Computer security computer.software_genre 020202 computer hardware & architecture Theoretical Computer Science Microarchitecture Computational Theory and Mathematics Hardware and Architecture 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Cache Hardware_CONTROLSTRUCTURESANDMICROPROGRAMMING Speculation computer Software |
| Zdroj: | IEEE Transactions on Computers. 70:963-978 |
| ISSN: | 2326-3814 0018-9340 |
| Popis: | Speculative execution side-channel vulnerabilities such as Spectre reveal that conventional architecture designs lack security consideration. This article proposes a software transparent defense framework, named as Conditional Speculation , against Spectre vulnerabilities found on traditional out-of-order microprocessors. It introduces the concept of security dependence to mark speculative memory instructions which could leak information with potential security risks. More specifically, security-dependent instructions are detected and marked with suspect speculation flags in the Issue Queue. All the instructions can be speculatively issued for execution in accordance with the classic out-of-order pipeline. For those instructions with suspect speculation flags, they are considered as safe instructions if their speculative execution dose not refill new cache lines with unauthorized privilege data. Otherwise, they are considered as unsafe instructions and thus not allowed to execute speculatively. To pursue a balance of performance and security, we investigate two filtering mechanisms, Cache-hit-based Hazard Filter and Trusted Page Buffer-based Hazard Filter to filter out false security hazards. As for true security hazards, we have two approaches to prevent them from changing cache states. One is to block all unsafe access, the other is to fetch them from lower-level caches or memory to a speculative buffer temporarily, and refill them after confirming that they are on the correct execution path. Our design philosophy is to speculatively execute safe instructions to maintain the performance benefits of out-of-order execution while delaying the cache updates for speculative execution of unsafe instructions for security consideration. We evaluate Conditional Speculation in terms of performance, security, and area. The experimental results show that the hardware overhead is marginal and the performance overhead is minimal. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|