Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games
| Autor: | Péter Vida, Takakazu Honryo |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Computer science 05 social sciences Stability (learning theory) Coupling (probability) Forward induction Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development Simple (abstract algebra) 0502 economics and business 050206 economic theory Communication source Strategic stability 050207 economics Mathematical economics Finance |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior. 127:102-112 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| Popis: | The concept of unprejudiced beliefs equilibrium is simple: out-of-equilibrium beliefs should be consistent with the principle that multiple deviations are infinitely less likely than single deviations. Our questions are: does there always exist such an equilibrium and what can be done if there are multiple such equilibria? To select a unique equilibrium, this notion is usually coupled with the intuitive criterion. The simultaneous usage of these concepts is ad hoc, unjustified, and again might eliminate all the equilibria. We show that coupling these notions is legitimate, as both are implied by strategic stability ( Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) ), hence a desired equilibrium always exists. The intuitive criterion is trivially implied by stability. We show that in generic multi-sender signaling games stable outcomes can be supported with unprejudiced beliefs. It follows by forward induction that stable sets contain an equilibrium which is unprejudiced and intuitive at the same time. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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