Do new entrants sustain, destroy, or create guaranteed profitability?

Autor:	Glenn M. MacDonald, Michael D. Ryall
Rok vydání:	2018
Předmět:	Microeconomics 050208 finance Strategy and Management 0502 economics and business 05 social sciences Profitability index New entrants Business Business and International Management Cooperative game theory 050203 business & management Value appropriation Profit (economics)
Zdroj:	Strategic Management Journal. 39:1630-1649
ISSN:	1097-0266 0143-2095
DOI:	10.1002/smj.2770
Popis:	Research and Managerial Summary: We examine the effect of any new agent on the value captured by an incumbent: e.g., a new rival, a new source of supply, a new customer, etc. Regardless of the new agent's type, entry has two opposing effects on the incumbent's minimum profitability guaranteed by competition. First, is the creation of more economic value. This tends to blunt competition and lowers minimum guaranteed profit. Second, is the potential generation of new productive alternatives for the incumbent, thereby inducing the opposite effect. We describe whether entry allows guaranteed profits to persist or creates guaranteed profits when they did not previously exist. We show that knowing that the entrant can replace the incumbent is not enough to determine the impact of entry on guaranteed minimum profits.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3dcdb6790486647173f53effd6ebf404 https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2770 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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