Measurement program: Investigation on cache-timing attack
| Autor: | Uwe Dippel, Yasir Khalid, Salman Yussof |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2009 |
| Předmět: |
Triple DES
Differential cryptanalysis Computer science Stream cipher attack Cryptography Related-key attack Computer security computer.software_genre law.invention Attack model Pre-play attack law Running key cipher Fluhrer Mantin and Shamir attack Side channel attack Stream cipher Block cipher business.industry Timing attack Power analysis Cipher Weak key Slide attack Cryptanalysis Correlation attack business computer |
| Zdroj: | 2009 IEEE 9th Malaysia International Conference on Communications (MICC). |
| DOI: | 10.1109/micc.2009.5431494 |
| Popis: | Recent cryptanalysis is able to reduce the strength of a cipher, without breaking the cipher as such, like in traditional cryptographic attacks. This is achieved by obtaining, and subsequently utilizing, some hardware information to recover the secret key or the message, or at least part thereof. This kind of attack is called side channel attack, and has changed the conceptual idea of cryptography from a black box system with a single input and a single output to a complex system, that produces plural, unexpected outputs, the so-called side-channel information in addition to the intended cryptographic output. This additional output can be used to break an implementation of a cipher. Cache-timing is one type of side channel attacks that is mostly done in general purpose computers. In this paper we are investigating cache-timing attacks, and show some experimental results that motivated us to develop a portable measurement program for such attacks. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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