On the Heuristic Value of Scientific Models
| Autor: | Herman Meyer |
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| Rok vydání: | 1951 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Philosophy of Science. 18:111-123 |
| ISSN: | 1539-767X 0031-8248 |
| DOI: | 10.1086/287137 |
| Popis: | Preliminary Remarks: Before entering into the subject matter of the paper, it may be useful to present American readers with a sketchy outline of presentday European philosophy of science, as it appeared to me at the International Congress of Philosophy of Science, held in Paris at the Sorbonne on October 15-22, 1949. The sections of which I can give a first hand impression and which are of particular interest for our subject, are those of physical science and of probability. The highlights in the physical section were the papers read by Louis Prince de Broglie (Paris) and L. Rosenfeld (Manchester). The former, who originated the wave-theory of matter, developed a new method for avoiding infinitely great energies in theoretical micro-physics, a problem to which he devoted several books and articles.' Professor Rosenfeld dwelt upon the startling intricacies arising out of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy. After hearing these papers and talking things over with some of those present, I came away with the impression that theoretical micro-physics is, at present, in an ever growing state of confusion. The original ideas have more or less outlived their usefulness and the most ingenious methods to cope with the difficulties which are cropping up, are neither consistent among themselves, nor do they tally with experience. A new principle, of which we have as yet no idea, will be needed to get out of the mess. As the concept of probability is obviously of primary importance in microphysics, it was interesting to hear what the scientists gathered in Paris had to say about it. Professor Jean-Louis Destouches (Sorbonne) spoke in the physical section about his general theory of predictions. This theory is an analysis of probability statements in quantum mechanics. It is gaining appreciation in Europe, but is perhaps not so well known in America.2 The theory does not, however, clarify whether probability statements express a fundamental character of nature, or whether they should be viewed solely as mental constructions. That we should not lightly brush this dilemma away, is at once apparent from the question that Professor Emil Borel (Sorbonne) laid before his audience in the section of probability; namely, what is the meaning of "negligibly small probabilities" for our knowledge of the outer world, and for guiding our actions. In his several books on probability the eminent French mathematician has referred to this theme again and again. In the lively discussion which followed, it |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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