Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction

Autor:	Paul Schweinzer, Olivier Bos, Béatrice Roussillon
Rok vydání:	2016
Předmět:	Productive efficiency Scheme (programming language) Economics and Econometrics Stylized fact Public economics 05 social sciences Principal (computer security) Environmental economics CONTEST Reduction (complexity) Incentive Policy decision 0502 economics and business Economics 050207 economics computer 050205 econometrics computer.programming_language
Zdroj:	The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 118:785-815
ISSN:	0347-0520
DOI:	10.1111/sjoe.12164
Popis:	We propose a simple contest-based mechanism providing incentives to reduce harmful emissions to their efficient level without infringing upon productive efficiency. Participation in the most stylized form of the scheme is voluntary and individually rational; all rules are mutually agreeable and are unanimously adopted if proposed. The scheme balances its budget and requires no principal. In a perhaps more realistic stochastic output version, which could potentially inform policy decisions, we show that the transfers required by the efficient mechanism create a mutual insurance motive that can serve as an effective rationale for the (gradual) formation of international environmental agreements.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3c33f9f0ab8d8ef3658fadff60ec32ec https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12164 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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