Why principals tolerate biases of inaccurate agents
| Autor: | Amihai Glazer, Kimiko Terai |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Corruption media_common.quotation_subject High ability 05 social sciences Principal–agent problem Special Interest Group ComputingMethodologies_ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE 0506 political science Microeconomics Harm Principal (commercial law) 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration Economics Bureaucracy 050207 economics media_common |
| Zdroj: | Economics & Politics. 31:97-111 |
| ISSN: | 0954-1985 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/ecpo.12119 |
| Popis: | Some agents are more accurate than others in estimating the best policy. The more accurately an agent estimates a policy's effects, the more he will resist biases, such as bribes from a special interest. Thus, a special interest needs to pay a larger bribe to an accurate agent than to an inaccurate agent. The accurate agent who is biased will then more likely cause harm than does an inaccurate agent who favors the special interest. Therefore, the principal may gain more from controlling biases of an accurate agent than of an inaccurate one. Thus, high ability of public officials may be associated with little corruption. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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