Dispute resolution mechanisms and teacher bargaining outcomes
| Autor: | Michael A. Zigarelli |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 1996 |
| Předmět: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Labour economics De facto Strategy and Management media_common.quotation_subject education Wage Dispute mechanism Dispute resolution Collective bargaining Management of Technology and Innovation Value (economics) Economics Liberian dollar Arbitration health care economics and organizations media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Labor Research. 17:135-148 |
| ISSN: | 1936-4768 0195-3613 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/bf02685789 |
| Popis: | This study investigates the impact of dispute resolution mechanisms on the wages and hours of public school teachers. The 43-state analysis presents evidence that (1) a permissible right to strike increases teacher wages by 11.5 percent and reduces class hours by 37 minutes per day; (2) a de facto right to strike increases salaries by 5.7 percent and reduces class hours by 44 minutes per day; (3) arbitration availability is associated with a wage effect of 3.6 percent and 70 fewer class minutes per day; and (4) factfinding and voluntary arbitration have no significant influences on outcomes. A direct comparison of the right to strike and the right to arbitrate indicates that a legal right to strike affords teachers greater power to increase the dollar value of their work. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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