How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?

Autor:	Wai-hung Wong, Zanja Yudell
Rok vydání:	2012
Předmět:	Fallacy of the single cause Fallacy Philosophy Formal fallacy Mathematical fallacy Fallacy of four terms Conjunction fallacy Fallacy of division Epistemology Deductive fallacy
Zdroj:	Philosophical Studies. 165:221-227
ISSN:	1573-0883 0031-8116
DOI:	10.1007/s11098-012-9947-y
Popis:	Timothy Williamson argues against the tactic of criticizing confidence in a theory by identifying a logical consequence of the theory whose probability is not raised by the evidence. He dubs it “the consequence fallacy”. In this paper, we will show that Williamson’s formulation of the tactic in question is ambiguous. On one reading of Williamson’s formulation, the tactic is indeed a fallacy, but it is not a commonly used tactic; on another reading, it is a commonly used tactic (or at least more often used than the former tactic), but it is not a fallacy.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3bbacb00c2191f528257dfb5ff1d5cfd https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9947-y Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink