Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules
| Autor: | John A. Weymark, Craig Brett |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Economics and Econometrics Majority rule Schedule business.industry media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Distribution (economics) Unconstrained optimization Zero (linguistics) Nonlinear system Income tax Voting 0502 economics and business Economics 050207 economics business Computer Science::Operating Systems Mathematical economics Finance 050205 econometrics media_common |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior. 101:172-188 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| Popis: | Majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of individuals who have quasilinear-in-consumption preferences is considered. Roell (2012) has shown that individual preferences over these schedules are single-peaked. In this article, a complete characterization of selfishly optimal schedules is provided. Each selfishly optimal schedule has a bunching region in a neighborhood of the proposer's skill type, coincides with the maxi-max schedule below this region, and coincides with the maxi-min schedule above it. Using techniques introduced by Vincent and Mason (1967) , the bunching region is identified by solving an unconstrained optimization problem. Information about the optimal schedules is used to provide a relatively simple proof of single-peakedness. The Condorcet-winning tax schedule features marginal tax rates that are negative (resp. positive) on the maxi-max (resp. maxi-min) part of the schedule except at the endpoints of the skill distribution where they are zero. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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