Natural Resource Use with Vague-Transferability in Property Right
| Autor: | Etienne Bienvenu Akono |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
0208 environmental biotechnology
05 social sciences Perfect information ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Vagueness Context (language use) 02 engineering and technology Natural resource 020801 environmental engineering Microeconomics symbols.namesake Resource (project management) Subgame Property rights Nash equilibrium 0502 economics and business symbols Economics 050202 agricultural economics & policy General Environmental Science |
| Zdroj: | Environmental Modeling & Assessment. 23:15-24 |
| ISSN: | 1573-2967 1420-2026 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10666-017-9566-2 |
| Popis: | The purpose of this paper is to study the impacts of the vagueness about the transfer of the harvest right on the use of a natural resource. We develop one-period non-cooperative game frameworks to examine whether the choice of the resource owner to be hazy about the transmission of the harvest contract is optimal. In the perfect information situation, we show that it is optimal for the resource owner to forbid the transfer of the harvest right instead of being hazy about it when the transfer fees are lesser than the collected net punishment fines of the monitoring costs even though the resource would be inefficiently used. In particular, we find in this case that the government’s announcement to forbid the transfer of the right should be public. We further show that there are subgame Nash equilibria in the perfect information context and a unique Nash equilibrium in the imperfect information setting. Specifically, we show that, when the transfer fees are greater or equal to the (net) punishment fines, there is a Nash equilibrium both in perfect and imperfect information situations, precisely when the owner chooses to allow the transfer of harvest title and the resource harvester transfers it. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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