A social-ecological trap perspective to explain the emergence and persistence of illegal fishing in small-scale fisheries
Autor: | Laura Nahuelhual, Tomás Vallejos, María Amalia Mellado, Gonzalo Saavedra, Ximena Vergara |
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Rok vydání: | 2019 |
Předmět: |
0106 biological sciences
Geography Planning and Development Fishing Subsistence agriculture Legislation 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences Management Monitoring Policy and Law Development Aquatic Science 01 natural sciences 010601 ecology Fishery Intermediary Denunciation 040102 fisheries 0401 agriculture forestry and fisheries Private rights Deterrence theory Business Legitimacy Water Science and Technology |
Zdroj: | Maritime Studies. 19:105-117 |
ISSN: | 2212-9790 1872-7859 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s40152-019-00154-1 |
Popis: | We use the social-ecological trap (SET) concept and path-dependence analysis to explain the emergence and persistence of illegal fishing, taking the Chilean king crab fishery as a case study. The results suggest that the fishery is caught in a SET, which we label the “illegality trap”, characterized by positive feedbacks between regulation astringency, illegal access, fishers’ resistance, and fishing effort that keep the fishery in an undesirable state. As a process, illegal fishing arises as the denunciation of past poverty conditions and policies enacted to protect private rights to the sea, against traditional fishing logics. As a state of the system, illegal fishing is a relational phenomenon involving fishers, intermediaries, processors, and consumers. Over time, the different types of fishers emerge along well-structured international and local fish chains: the legal fisher, the cooperative fisher, the legal-illegal fisher, and the illegal fisher, encompassing a continuum from subsistence to competitive rationalities, which reflect adaptive strategies in the face of normative-legislative constrictions and market opportunities. Yet, the “legal” or the “illegal” is not a permanent condition, but it can be one and/or the other, depending on the circumstances. These results contend the reductionist view of the deterrence dogma which depicts illegal fishing as a matter of rational utility maximizers. On the contrary, the SET described here reflects the complexity of a problem with many edges, from legislation legitimacy to cultural responses across all the actors involved. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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