September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies
| Autor: | Amy B. Zegart |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2005 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | International Security. 29:78-111 |
| ISSN: | 1531-4804 0162-2889 |
| DOI: | 10.1162/isec.2005.29.4.78 |
| Popis: | In January 2000, alQaida operatives gathered secretly in Malaysia for a planning meeting. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was watching. Among the participants was Khalid al-Mihdhar, one of the hijackers who would later help to crash American Airlines flight 77 into the Pentagon. By the time the meeting disbanded, the CIA had taken a photograph of al-Mihdhar, learned his full name, obtained his passport number, and uncovered one other critical piece of information: alMihdhar held a multiple-entry visa to the United States.' It was twenty months before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. George Tenet, the director of central intelligence (DCI), later admitted that the CIA should have placed al-Mihdhar on the State Department's watch list denying him entry into the United States.2 It did not until August 23, 2001, just nineteen days before the terrorist attacks and months after al-Mihdhar had entered the country, obtained a California motor vehicle photo identification card (using his real name), and started taking flying lessons. The case of Khalid al-Mihdhar provides a chilling example of the subtle yet powerful effects of organization-that is, the routines, structures, and cultures that critically influence what government agencies do and how well they do it. Why did the CIA take so long to put this suspected al-Qaida operative on the State Department's watch list, especially given Director Tenet's earlier declaration that the United States was "at war" with al-Qaida, and when U.S. intelli |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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