| Popis: |
The sense of agency (SoA) is the feeling of intentionally moving our body and, through it, affecting the environment. In line with this definition, studies aim to affect SoA by manipulating either a representation of a movement or the consequences of that movement on the environment. However, it is unclear whether the underlying assumption is valid, that these two kinds of manipulations equally affect the SoA. Using a novel experimental paradigm, we aim to address this question by systematically manipulating these two components: a representation of the movement itself vs its effects on the environment. Further, we will employ as dependent measures estimates of metacognitive performance to compare different conditions devoid of response biases in subjective measures, which are often present in typical agency tasks. To do so we will use a virtual version of a ball throwing game, the “Skittles” (Sternad et al., 2011). Using this motor task, in a set of experiments conducted, we found that people can metacognitively monitor both the representations of their volitional movements and the outcomes accompanying these movements equally well. We will adapt the motor task, to turn it into a two-interval forced-choice task (IFC), which means that participants will throw the ball two times on each trial. We will include two conditions to compare metacognition of agency over the movement and over the outcome. To do so we will manipulate the visual feedback as follows: The visual feedback will be congruent with what participants did in only one of the two intervals and incongruent in the other: Either the movement or the outcome (ball flight trajectory) will not match what participants did. On each trial, participants select the interval in which they felt they were more in control and rate their confidence in that decision. In addition to that, we will record electrophysiology (EEG) and electrooculography (EOG) data. After matching participants' first-order performance we will compare both the neural signature and metacognition of the sense of agency on both conditions. |
