| Popis: |
Delegated models of electoral governance (in which duties and power to appoint members of the electoral commission will be borne by the non-partisan bodies) are expected to reduce impasses caused by partisan clashes, keep away stakeholders from the decision-making process, increase confidence in the impartiality, avoid partisan favoritism and curtailment of opponents, thus increasing electoral integrity. The lack of that delegation, thus, would be one of the possible vulnerabilities to fraud and manipulation that can be found in different models of electoral governance. On the other hand, the share of electoral management power among the political parties is also expected to produce trust and confidence as all relevant actors are included in the decision processes. This paper compares legislative elections in Latin America since redemocratization to verify the relationship between the vulnerabilities of electoral governance models and the quality of elections. The findings indicate that, in Latin America, among all dimensions of electoral governance, the delegation to non-partisan actors plays a critical role, being associated with institutional environments with no concerns about the integrity of elections. |
