Payoff-Improving Competition: Games with Negative Externalities
| Autor: | Petros G. Sekeris, Kevin Siqueira |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Economics and Econometrics Strategic complements Strategy and Management 05 social sciences Stochastic game Cournot competition Competition (economics) Common-pool resource Microeconomics Management of Technology and Innovation 0502 economics and business Economics Production (economics) 050207 economics Externality 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | Review of Industrial Organization. 58:455-474 |
| ISSN: | 1573-7160 0889-938X |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11151-020-09757-z |
| Popis: | We demonstrate that more intense competition in games with production and negative externalities may be payoff-improving, and therefore welcomed by incumbents. In games that feature equilibria with strategic complements, increased competition may give rise to a new equilibrium where aggregate effort is lower, and the resulting reduced levels of externalities ultimately leaves all players better off. This setting applies to models of Cournot oligopoly, of common pool resources, and contests with endogenous prizes. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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