| Popis: |
Touch gives us tactile sensations that inform us of events that happen in and on our bodies (T), and haptic perception of things with which we are in direct or indirect contact (i.e. through intervening objects) (H). In the first part of this paper, I argue that these are distinct mental states (i.e. that T≠H). My strategy is to establish a double dissociation between T and H. Thus, it is possible to have similar sequences of tactile sensations T1 and T2, such that one yields a haptic perception and the other does not. And it is also possible to have the same haptic perception through different sequences of tactile sensations. This contradicts the idea that the switch from touch-awareness of one’s own body and touch-awareness of external objects is merely attentional: that being aware of something that you are touching is merely a matter of attending to your own body, but in a different way. In the second part of the chapter, I argue that tactile sensation does not represent space, but rather represents the relationships among parts of the body. This argument involves a reinterpretation of experimental results regarding touch-awareness by Patrick Haggard and co-workers. |
