Settling with salience-biased defendants

Autor:	Cat Lam Pham, Tim Friehe
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Plaintiff Salience (language) 0502 economics and business 05 social sciences ComputingMethodologies_IMAGEPROCESSINGANDCOMPUTERVISION Economics ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING 050207 economics GeneralLiterature_REFERENCE(e.g. dictionaries encyclopedias glossaries) Finance 050205 econometrics Law and economics
Zdroj:	Economics Letters. 192:109235
ISSN:	0165-1765
DOI:	10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109235
Popis:	This paper analyzes how a salience bias of the defendant influences the settlement process and outcome. We consider the classic screening model in which the plaintiff makes a settlement demand on the privately informed defendant. In our framework, the plaintiff’s settlement demand increases with the defendant’s salience bias and the defendant’s salience bias may make the plaintiff worse off.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3558ae86bc3dcc318445765f9ee3a498 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109235 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect