Mechanism and the Representational Nature of Sensation in Descartes
| Autor: | Laura Keating |
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| Rok vydání: | 1999 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 29:411-429 |
| ISSN: | 1911-0820 0045-5091 |
| Popis: | Commentators have argued that along with adopting a mechanical view of nature, Descartes developed two innovative views concerning sensation: sensation occurs without the involvement of an entity resembling the sensation, and sensations represent features of objects but without resembling them. When Descartes is interpreted as making both of these claims, it appears that in removing resemblance from the causal process of sensation, Descartes preserves the notion that sensations represent features of objects and that he does this by introducing a new conception of representation — one not requiring resemblance.It is important to recognize that the two claims are distinct. The first claim, that the physical process of sensation does not involve something resembling the qualitative content of the sensation, does not in and of itself entail anything about the representational nature of the sensation. Or rather, what it does entail is that if sensations do represent their causes in objects, then it cannot be by presenting those causes to the mind as they exist in objects. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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