Non‐Reservation Price Equilibrium and Search without Priors

Autor:	Alexei Parakhonyak, Anton Sobolev
Rok vydání:	2015
Předmět:	TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS Economics and Econometrics business.industry Distribution (economics) Search procedure Reservation price Monopoly price Prior probability Price dispersion Econometrics Search cost Economics Optimal stopping rule business
Zdroj:	The Economic Journal. 125:887-909
ISSN:	1468-0297 0013-0133
Popis:	We analyse a model of oligopolistic competition in which consumers search without priors. Consumers do not have prior beliefs about the distribution of prices charged by firms and thus try to use a robust search procedure. We show that the optimal stopping rule is stochastic and that for any distribution of search costs there is a unique market equilibrium which is characterised by price dispersion. Although listed prices approach the monopoly price as the number of firms increases, the effective price paid by consumers does not depend on the number of firms.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::353ea0a496cb0be06d75b746a0ae5b89 https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12265 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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