Incentives and Selection in Promotion Contests: Is It Possible to Kill Two Birds with One Stone?
| Autor: | Rudi Stracke, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Wolfgang Höchtl, Uwe Sunde |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2014 |
| Předmět: |
Strategy and Management
media_common.quotation_subject Management Science and Operations Research CONTEST Competition (economics) Microeconomics Identification (information) Promotion (rank) Incentive Management of Technology and Innovation Key (cryptography) Economics Business and International Management Dimension (data warehouse) Selection (genetic algorithm) media_common |
| Zdroj: | Managerial and Decision Economics. 36:275-285 |
| ISSN: | 0143-6570 |
| DOI: | 10.1002/mde.2666 |
| Popis: | This paper investigates whether a designer can improve both the incentive provision and the selection performance of a promotion contest by making the competition more (or less) dynamic. A comparison of static (one-stage) and dynamic (two-stage) contests reveals that this is not the case. A structural change that improves the performance in one dimension leads to a deterioration in the other dimension. This suggests that modifications of the contest structure are an alternative to strategic handicaps. A key advantage of structural handicaps over participant-specific ones is that the implementation of the former does not require prior identification of worker types. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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