| Popis: |
Building simulated affects into artifacts poses a moral dilemma. On the one hand, in order for humans to interact fully with machines, the machines need to meet them on human terms, and this requires machines that are capable of assessing human affective states and responding to them in kind. On the other hand, doing so amounts to a fundamental deception that humans will find it hard to keep in mind, namely that these machines do not actually have these affective states and may not, therefore, be worthy of our attachment and our moral regard. Yet, simulated affects, we argue, are necessary for creating machines that can make moral decisions, that affects are essential for disambiguating the utterances of machines and humans, and that not all forms of deception are bad. After an initial provocation, these arguments are taken up in order, after which we argue further that while simulated affects are necessary, they could nonetheless lead to abuse. Therefore, the standard ethical limits and principles involved with any technological innovation must be respected. |
