Incentive pay and acquirer returns – The impact of Sarbanes–Oxley
| Autor: | Marcin W. Krolikowski |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
040101 forestry
Finance Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance Executive compensation business.industry media_common.quotation_subject Event (relativity) 05 social sciences Accounting 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences Incentive 0502 economics and business Sarbanes–Oxley Act 0401 agriculture forestry and fisheries Quality (business) Business media_common |
| Zdroj: | The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. 59:99-111 |
| ISSN: | 1062-9769 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.qref.2015.06.007 |
| Popis: | This study examines how pay-for-performance influences the quality of merger decisions before and after Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX). Pay-for performance has a significant positive effect on acquirer returns of 0.9% pre-SOX and 1.1% post-SOX around the three-day event window. Bidders with high pay-for-performance pay a 23.3% lower merger premium in listed target acquisitions. The positive effect of pay-for-performance is more important for public target acquisitions overall, for small acquirers pre-SOX, and for large acquirers post-SOX. In the long run, bidders with high pre-merger pay-for-performance do not necessarily outperform. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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