DOWNSTREAM MERGERS AND UPSTREAM INVESTMENT*

Autor:	Joel Sandonís, Juana Santamaria, Ramón Faulí-Oller
Rok vydání:	2011
Předmět:	Upstream (petroleum industry) Competition (economics) Economics and Econometrics Incentive Downstream (manufacturing) Economics Revenue Context (language use) Monetary economics Investment (macroeconomics) health care economics and organizations Industrial organization
Zdroj:	The Manchester School. 79:884-898
ISSN:	1463-6786
Popis:	In this paper, we show that downstream mergers increase the incentives of an up-stream firm to invest in cost-reducing R&D. The upstream firm revenues increase with industry profits, which in turn increase with concentration downstream and this explains the positive link between concentration and investment. This effect is so important that it outweights the negative effect on prices due to lower competition. Therefore, in our context, horizontal mergers are pro-competitive.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::31a72631562c0bfc610c979a402d17f1 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02209.x Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF