Electoral Opportunism and Vertical Fiscal Imbalance
| Autor: | Osvaldo Meloni |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Macroeconomics
Fiscal imbalance 05 social sciences Investment (macroeconomics) Fiscal union 0506 political science Information asymmetry Incentive 0502 economics and business Opportunism 050602 political science & public administration Economics Fiscal federalism 050207 economics General Economics Econometrics and Finance Panel data |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Applied Economics. 19:145-167 |
| ISSN: | 1667-6726 1514-0326 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/s1514-0326(16)30006-x |
| Popis: | Evidence of political budget cycles from cross-country studies has been rationalized as coming from the voters' cost to process the available information and asymmetric information. This explanation has also been adopted in most cross-province studies, leaving aside variables related to the incentive structure of fiscal federalism. This paper investigates electorally induced fiscal fluctuations in Argentina for the period 1985–2007. Province-level dynamic panel data reveal that vertical fiscal imbalances in subnational districts fuel fiscal expansion and changes in expenditure composition, favoring current expenditure to the detriment of investment, in election years. Vertical fiscal imbalances make electoral opportunism cheaper and more profitable. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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