Public-Private Partnerships, Dividing Operational Stage, and Optimal Governance Structures
| Autor: | Kosuke Oshima |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
media_common.quotation_subject
Corporate governance 05 social sciences Prison Public administration Task (project management) Property rights 0502 economics and business Private finance initiative Economics Business Management and Accounting (miscellaneous) Incomplete contracts 050207 economics Unbundling Law 050203 business & management Industrial organization media_common Public finance |
| Zdroj: | Public Organization Review. 16:443-459 |
| ISSN: | 1573-7098 1566-7170 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11115-015-0321-3 |
| Popis: | Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) include various governance structures which distribute tasks and ownership of facility differently. Many earlier theoretical studies using the incomplete contracts theory assume two tasks, building and operation, for the projects of public services. This may be too simple, however, to consider complicated projects such as prisons. Critics argue that those studies could not fully explain the reality. In addition, Those models are not suitable for comparing different PPP approaches such as Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and private management. The present paper divides the task of operation into two (maintenance and security). This enables us to compare four relevant governance structures in a single framework, and to suggest the conditions for successful PPP prison projects. The main findings are that the tasks of maintenance and security should be conducted by different parties (private consortium and civil servant) under certain conditions, while unbundling construction and operation stages is desirable in other cases. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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