| Autor: |
Philippe Lambert, Sergio Perelman, Jérome Schoenmaeckers, Pierre Pestieau |
| Rok vydání: |
2011 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
The Individual and the Welfare State ISBN: 9783642174711 |
| DOI: |
10.1007/978-3-642-17472-8_20 |
| Popis: |
The term adverse selection is used in the insurance literature to describe a situation where an individual’s demand for insurance (either the propensity to buy insurance, or the quantity purchased, or both) is positively correlated with the individual’s risk of loss (e.g. higher risks buy more insurance), and the insurer is unable to allow for this correlation in the price of insurance. This may be because of private information known only to the individual, or because of regulations or social norms which prevent the insurer from using certain categories of known information to differentiate prices (e.g. the insurer may be prohibited from using information such as gender or ethnic origin or genetic tests). To test for the presence of adverse selection one checks the conjecture that contracts with more comprehensive coverage are chosen by agents with higher accident risk. |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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