Mixed incentive contracts in partnerships

Autor:	Kevin Siqueira, Hong Chao
Rok vydání:	2013
Předmět:	Microeconomics Economics and Econometrics Teamwork Incentive Compensation (psychology) General partnership media_common.quotation_subject Economics Contract management Production (economics) Tournament Welfare media_common
Zdroj:	International Journal of Economic Theory. 9:147-159
ISSN:	1742-7355
DOI:	10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12011.x
Popis:	This paper illustrates the impact of mixed contracts on teamwork and welfare in a partnership when production depends on the efforts of agents in their own tasks as well as their efforts in helping other teammates. We show that a mixed contract that combines compensation based on team output with that of a tournament based on individual output leads to higher welfare than a purely team-output-based contract, despite the possibility of sabotage and the possible adverse impacts that the contract may have on the allocation of agent efforts.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3090711c98f1ae3db987d2223007483d https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12011.x Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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