Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth

Autor:	Andrew Howat
Rok vydání:	2011
Předmět:	Structure (mathematical logic) Philosophy Logic Argument media_common.quotation_subject Appeal Ontology Certainty Function (engineering) Parallels media_common Epistemology
Zdroj:	Erkenntnis. 78:451-468
ISSN:	1572-8420 0165-0106
Popis:	This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are popularly called ‘hinge propositions’.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2ef2d81e6c25f12c879fb7036426c601 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9351-6 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink