On the mismeasurement of sincere and strategic voting in mixed-member electoral systems
| Autor: | Carolina Plescia |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
021110 strategic
defence & security studies Spoilt vote media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies 02 engineering and technology Ranked voting system Public administration 0506 political science Cardinal voting systems Contingent vote Straight-ticket voting Political science Voting Political Science and International Relations 050602 political science & public administration Bullet voting Preferential block voting media_common Law and economics |
| Zdroj: | Electoral Studies. 48:19-29 |
| ISSN: | 0261-3794 |
| Popis: | Under mixed systems, voters cast two votes to elect the same legislative body: one vote for parties using proportional rules and one for candidates using majoritarian rules. Voters are said to cast straight-tickets if the candidate they vote for is of the same party as their proportional vote; otherwise, they are said to cast split-tickets. Split-ticket voting is commonly used as a measure of strategic voting as splitters are usually assumed to express their true preference in one vote but vote strategically in the other. This study challenges this practice showing that split-ticket voting does not necessarily indicate strategic voting, just as straight-ticket voting does not necessarily indicate a sincere vote. This result has wider consequences as it indicates that measuring strategic voting from observed behaviour can result in incorrect conclusions about vote choice. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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