Relaxing benevolence: public choice, socialist calculation, and planner self-interest

Autor:	Andrew Farrant, Eric Crampton
Rok vydání:	2006
Předmět:	media_common.quotation_subject Planned economy Public choice Neoclassical economics Planner Argument Economics Self-interest Normative General Economics Econometrics and Finance computer Public finance computer.programming_language media_common
Zdroj:	The Review of Austrian Economics. 19:81-93
ISSN:	1573-7128 0889-3047
DOI:	10.1007/s11138-006-6095-7
Popis:	The Austrian calculation argument suggests that inability to engage in economic calculation worsened outcomes in socialist states. We suggest that this is hardly the case. When Austrian assumptions of benevolence are relaxed, inability to engage in economic calculation prevents the non-benevolent planner from fully extracting all available surplus from the citizenry. Consequently, when planners are non-benevolent, calculation ceases to be a relevant argument against the desirability of central planning; its normative force reverses absent benevolent planners.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2da327d958648dc485e09c853f4aef56 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-006-6095-7 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink