| Autor: |
Karl J. Friston, Jakub Limanowski |
| Rok vydání: |
2020 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences. 1:1-16 |
| ISSN: |
2699-0369 |
| DOI: |
10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.35 |
| Popis: |
In this paper, we address reports of “selfless” experiences from the perspective of active inference and predictive processing. Our argument builds upon grounding self-modelling in active inference as action planning and precision control within deep generative models – thus establishing a link between computational mechanisms and phenomenal selfhood. We propose that “selfless” experiences can be interpreted as (rare) cases in which normally congruent processes of computational and phenomenal self-modelling diverge in an otherwise conscious system. We discuss two potential mechanisms – within the Bayesian mechanics of active inference – that could lead to such a divergence by attenuating the experience of selfhood: “self-flattening” via reduction in the depth of active inference and “self-attenuation” via reduction of the expected precision of self-evidence. |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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