The finite horizon, undiscounted, durable goods monopoly problem with finitely many consumers
| Autor: | Gerardo Berbeglia, Adrian Vetta, Peter Sloan |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Economics and Econometrics Discounting Applied Mathematics 05 social sciences Durable good Finite horizon Characterization (mathematics) Computer Science::Computers and Society Subgame perfect equilibrium Business economics Monopoly price 0502 economics and business 050207 economics Monopoly Mathematical economics 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Mathematical Economics. 82:171-183 |
| ISSN: | 0304-4068 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.11.002 |
| Popis: | We study the uncommitted durable goods monopoly problem when there are finitely many consumers, a finite horizon, and no discounting. In particular we characterize the set of strong-Markov subgame perfect equilibria that satisfy the skimming property. We show that in any such equilibrium the profits are not less than static monopoly profits; and at most the static monopoly profits plus the monopoly price. When each consumer is small relative to the market, profits are then approximately the same as those of a static monopolist which sets a single price. Finally, we extend the equilibrium characterization to games with an arbitrary discount factor. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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